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ABSTRACT
With the rapid increase in LDC indebtedness in the recentdecade, the
issues of creditworthiness and country risk have gainednew importance.
This paper offers a theoretical and historicalanalysis of international
capital markets in the presence of default risk. The theoretical model
suggests the possibility of a prisoners' dilemma in the loan market, in
which a country's dominant noncooperativestrategy is to default, though
a welfare—improving cooperative strategy is available. The historical
analysis suggests that the IMF may play a key role in guiding creditors





(617) 495—4112The private capital markets of the advanced industrial economies reopened on
a large scale to less developed country (LDC) borrowers in the past decade,
after a hiatus of nearly forty years. Private lending to LDC sovereign
borrowers grew sharply in the early 1970s, and then soared in the aftermath of
the first OPEC oil shock, in 1973 (see Table 1). This momentous change
reflected shifts in banking practices within an existing regulatory environment,
rather than new official policy governing international capital flows. The IMP
and central banks did not create the new environment, and have had to work
quickly to adapt their own policies to it. Broadly speaking, this essay takes
the regulator's perspective, by asking what guidelines should govern the over-
sight and control of private international capital flows to theLDCs.My focus
will be on the issue of LDC creditworthiness and the prospects for defaults in
international loans.I do not consider an equally important aspect of the debt
problem, the vulnerability of the international banks to a major default.
The salutary effects of high international capital mobility on the world
economy in the past decade cannot be over—stressed. Most importantly,
widespread access to foreign capital allowed the middle—income developing
countries to sustain very high growth rates in the 1970s, in spite of the OPEC
shocks and the sluggish growth of the developed economies. These countries
experienced real GNP growth of 5.6 percent per annum during 1970—80, little
reduced from the 6.2 percent rate of the previous decade, in large part because
of high domestic investment rates sustained by foreign borrowing.—2—
Table1_Oil-importing developing countries'current accountdeficit and finance sources, 1970—80
(bil!iunsof 2978 d !1ar ___________________________
((II z,,,1'rttr
lmi-su&o's' Middle-inc ei?it'
Item H70 1973 197 1978 (98(1 197(3 197.3 1975 1978 1980
Current account decil 3.6 4(3 7.31 5.1 9.1 14.9 6.7 42.820 448.9
Financed by.
Net capita! flows 3.3 5.3 5.3 6.5 7.9
O[)A 14 41 6.6 5.1
0.2 3.4 5.1 3.8 4.6 4.5
Private direct investment (1,3 0.2 0.4 0.2
0.7 8.9 13.721.029.4 27.1
Commercial loans 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9
Change's lii reservesand
tiuirt-tcrtui(OrrO?u'iuu' —0.5 —1.1 --0.7 —1.1 2.4 —(1.8—11.712.7—20.1 9.5
Ale,ncura ceduinItt'u
Current account (leficit 2.6 1.0 5.5 2.3 5.0
as percentage of GNP - L9 2.43.92.6 4.5
a Ecl udes net uctIicia I transfers (gri1. cc h ic h rc i nclu dccl in Capital flows
b. A minus sign (—I indicates an mci cisc in re,servcS
Source: World Development Report 1981, World Bank, p.49.—3—
On the other hand, serious economic and political stressesemerged in a
number of countries and in the world financial markets,as some borrowers became
seriously overextended in indebtedness. Overall, the non—OPEC LDCs increased
their net debt from $57 billion in 1970, or 13.7percent of GNP, to $221 billion
in 1979, approximately 17.7 percent of GNP (Sachs [1981], Table 1).No less
than 11 countries have been required to reschedule debt to official andprivate
creditors since 1975, and in most of those reschedulings, countries have been
required by creditors to commit themselves to sharply contractionary policies to
restrict new international borrowing. While we shallsee that many of these
austerity programs have been successful in alleviating debt difficulties, their
costs in terms of reduced employment and income in the debtor countries have
often been very large.
The dangers of the growing international indebtednessare many—sided, with
major risks borne both by creditors and debtors. Most directly, the creditors
both official and private, bear the risk of an outright repudiationor default
of outstanding international debt.The long history of international capital
flows in the 1gth and early 20th century underscores such defaultrisk, for
there is an impressive 150—year record of international defaults bysovereign
borrowers, including repeated defaults by Latin American governments, Turkey.,
Egypt, Portugal, Russia, and others, as well as defaults by no less than 17
American states on bonds floated in Europe in the 19thcentury. Of course, the
most recent episode of widespread international defaults occurred in 1931 and
1932, during the Great Depression, and was the cause of the collapse of inter—-4-
national borrowing for the succeeding forty years. It is a story to which I
shall return.
Until the cataclysm of the Great Depression, the cycle of defaults was con-
sidered a part of the normal working of the international financial system, and
certainly not a threat to the stability of' the overall economic order.
Creditors received substantial risk premia on foreign loans to compensate for
default or "sovereign risk", and the governments of creditors were typ4cally
content to allow their nationals to suffer defaults without significant public
intervention on their behalf (however, experiences varied, as we will see
below).
With the onset of the worldwide, synchronized defaults of the early 1930s,
official attitudes changed, regarding both the merits of free private capital
movements, and the ramifications of default. Banks, governments, and multila-
teral institutions have gone to great lengths in recent years to avoid sovereign
default, both through positive incentives (e.g. concessionary loans in return
for debtor adjustment policies) and concerted threats of strong retaliation for
debt repudiation. Measured by default frequency, the set of policies has thus
far been remarkably successful: there have been almost no cases of outright
repudiation of debt since 1945, (examples include North Korea and Ghana,and
the repudiation by Ghana was converted to a rescheduling of debt obligations
after subsequent multilateral negotiations). Moreover, there is no doubt that
recent events in many debtor economies would have led to default under pre-'WWII
rules of' the game, but have instead resulted in IMF—supervised adjustment poli——5—
cies and debt reschedulings. Many threats remain, however. Debt reschedulings
have become increasingly common (see below), and arrears in interest due have
been rising steadily, now topping $5 billion. Moreover, there have been calls
in recent years, e.g. by the Group of 77 in 1977, for a moratorium on LDC debt
payments. Most large LDC borrowers rejected this approach though.
One reason for the plethora of pre-1930 defaults versus post—1945
rescheduling, is that the early period was characterized by non—cooperative
strategies of creditors and debtors, while the post—1945 period is characterized
by extensive bargaining and cooperative strategies of banks arid the LDCs.
Formal models of the costs and benefits of default show that there is often a
prisoners' dilemma aspect to loan agreements. The payoff matrix for creditors
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Here, the debtor prefers to default no matter what the strategy pursued by the—6—
creditor, and the creditor wants to call in loans no matter what action the deb-
tor takes. The resulting non—cooperative solution yields (—2,1), which is
clearly dominated by a policy of increased loans and demand restraint, yielding
(0,2), which a IMF—supervised debt-rescheduling package might achieve. In
situations where the PIF cannot intervene, such as Poland (which is not an IMF
member) the risk of default rises accordingly.
A second reason for the reduction in defaults is most likely a shift in
bargaining strength between debtors and creditors. After most defaults, in the
19th and early 20th century, private bondholder committees fended for themselves
in negotiations with debtor countries, and their options for retaliation were
rather limited. They could not rely on steady support from the central
government nor even necessarily from other financial institutions (e.g. banking
houses) or foreign bond markets. Since World War II, governments themselves
have become large creditors, and have also more aggressively intervened in
financial market oversight, in part through the IMF. The potential scope and
strength of retaliation to defaults has been considerably enhanced.
Of course, if defaults are prevented by threats of very strong creditor
retaliation, there is a risk of another sort imposed on LDC borrowers. The
default option can be a way for LDC borrowers to transfer economic risks to
their better diversified creditors, and thus may be part of an efficient debt
structure. In the past, when a large investment project failed, or a country's
terms of trade shifted adversely, a default often resulted. Now, the borrowing
country is forced instead to restrain consumption and growth for a number of
years to satisfy its debt commitments. It is quite possible that the ex ante
expected utility of both borrowers and lenders is raised by a debt package that-7-
includes a default option with a compensating risk premium.
Aside from the direct risks of default, there is another set of concerns
about LDC debt that might be termed "systemic" risks. A major default or
series of defaults could lead to bank failures in the advanced economies
perhaps with cascading effects through the world financial system. As
Kindleberger has persuasively argued, such risks are intensified in the inter-
national banking community because of the absence of a clear internatiqnal
"lender of last resort". There is no settled responsibility of domesti,.c central
banks vis—a—vis the foreign subsidiaries of domestic institutions, and the IMF
has abjured from a formal role as lender of last resort. Thus, the types of
bank bailout operations that forestall domestic financial panics might not be
forthcoming in the international setting. Unfortunately, I will be unable to
pursuethis theme in the current paper.
There is a similar, though less recognized, risk of cascading default origi-
nating inthe supply side of the credit markets. In the event of an isolated
default or failure of an international loan, there might arise a strong movement
among creditor institutions to reduce exposure on LDC debt across the board.
The costs of new loans or debt rollovers could rise sharply, thereby pushing a
number of additional economies into default. I will suggest later that such• a
market reaction helps to explain the widespread defaults of 1931 and 1932, and
that a similar paralysis almost gripped the international banks in 1974. The
possibility of a self—fulfilling prophecy of widespread default may remain the
greatest danger posed by the LDC debt today.-8-
There is a growing and very fine literature detailing various empirical
aspects of LDC borrowing, so that I may be brief in describing the recent
history of international capital movements. Thus, in the first section, I
outline a few stylized facts to characterize the international financial market
as a basis for the subsequent analysis. Next, I present a simple theoretical
model of the international capital markets under risk of sovereign default.
Various points are brought out in the model: (1) rationing will be a standard
device in credit allocation to sovereign borrowers; (2) rationed borrowers will
have an incentive to pursue particular current account goals, and to stimulate
domestic investment; (3) a cooperative solution between banks and sovereign
borrowers will tend to dominate a non—cooperative solution in loan negotiations;
(4) country risk rises with overall indebtedness of the country, and falls with
increasing investment rates in the country; (5) defaults, in general, provide a
useful, but imperfect form of insurance to debtor countries, so that an inter-
national capital market with no defaults is not necessarily our best policy
target.In the third section, I briefly review the history of sovereign
default, to document the major shifts in market organization between the
pre-WWII and post-WWII international capital markets. Finally, in the fourth
section of the paper, I analyze some aspects of borrowing in the 1970s in light
of the theoretical analysis of the previous section.—9—
I.LDC Indebtedness in the 1970s
As the description of LDC indebtdness and its growth is now well known, and
is widely available elsewhere, I will merely summarize the key characteristics
ofthe debt for later discussion.I
Current accountdeficits as a percentage of GNP rose sharply for the LDCs in
the1970s, as did the debt/GNP ratio.Table 2shows the current account posi-
tionof the LDCs, the developed countries, and the major oil exporters
throughout the 1970s. The raw numbers must be adjusted for inflation, since
debtor countries enjoy capital gains due to inflation on their outstanding debts
(i.e. reductions in the real value of their indebtedness) that reduce the effec-
tive current account deficits in any year. Thus, in 1978, for example, real
LDC deficits were only about half of the official magnitude, while OPEC was
really in deficit in the sense that the capital losses on its outstanding assets
exceeded in value the year's accumulation of financial claims.
Currentaccount deficits can be financed through a variety of financial
arrangements, including bank or bond debt, foreign direct investment, equity
investment, etc. While all types of financing reflect a claim by the rest of
theworld on the future income of the deficit country, only certain types of
assets are typically counted as "debt." These are the fixed—income claims on
the debtor country and its citizens, in the form of bank and bond indebtedness.
Mostdata refer to gross debt, but a more meaningful measure is net debt, in
which LDC claims on the rest of the world (e.g. foreign reserves of the central—10—
Tabk2 Nominal nd 1nflation-\djusled Current Accounts, Major flegions, l968—7'




Developcdcountries 3.4 4.0 6.8 11.2 8.6 10.9—25.1 4.9—13.7 — 19.5 13.5—28.4
Nonoil LDCs —6.0 —4.7 —8.8 —12.2 —6.3—7.3 —25.6—35.0 —25.2 —19.9—24.8 —34.3




Dcvelopedcoun(ries 2.1 2.5 5.2 9.5 7.1 8.6—26.6 5.1—13.3 18.4 14.5—27.3
Nonoil LDCs —4.3—2.5 —6.4—9.6 —3.9 —3.1—18.1—27.3 —19.4 —11.0 —10.0 —17.7




Developcd countries 3.3 3.6 7.1 12.4 8.9 10.2—29.0 5.1—12.6 —16.5 12.1—21.2
Nonoil LDCs —6.6—3.6 —8.8 —12.6 —4.9 —3.7 —19.8 —27.3 —18.4—9.8—8.3 —13.6




U.S dollars)d na. n.a. 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.9 6.6 9.1 11.4 132 19.8 na.
Net debt of nonoil
LDCs as a percent
ofGNP n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.7 12.3 12.9 16.3 16.9 18.0 18.5 17.7
Ex post real Inlcrect
ratc(U.S. Treasury
bill minus U.S. in-
f1alionratepercenl) 0.6 1.2 0.8 —0.3 0.2—0.5 —3.0 —0.2 —0.3 —0.8 —1.8 1.9
Sources No,iinal current account—tntcrn.ttictrr,rl Mon.tary Fund, IloIcncr of l'ar,nenrs Fea,booA. vartous tssucs: inflaoon.ad;usted current account—calculatiOns by
ilic author (see the appends). Interest p.-ryrncnts of LOCs—OrpanisatioriforEconon'uc Co-operation and Desclopinent. "Erternal Indebtedness of Developing Countti:
Present S,tuation and Future Prospects (Paris: OLCO. 19191, p. 32. and "Esiernal Debt Statistics for Devcloptng Countries: I...atest trends" (Paris: OECD. 1980). p. 14
ror )c.sr 1978; GNP for LDCs—lnternational Mcrnctary Fund, "Esternal Indebtedness of Dcveloptng Countries." Occasional Paper 3 (IMF, May 1981). p. 14; debt afno..
oil LD(c —table A.t of the ztppendiz; U.S. Gh1P dcftalor and three-month Treasury bit) rate—OECD, Main &ononiic Indicator:, various issues.
na. Not avajlat'le
a. Developed couniucs refers tO all industrial countries.
b. The conversron from spccil drawing rigirts (SDRs) to dollars 'cas done at the annual average dollar/SDR rate oleuchange.
c. ('alcul.-tlcd by adding the capital garns md losses on the net emmternat position in intercst-bcaring 3ssets to the nominal current account. conventmonally measured.
d. Rcfcrs to all LDCs. Ftgurcs for interest pamcnts on total (private and public) debt for nonoil LDCs are not available.
c. Calculated at the arerage for the year of (he differencc beween the quarterly three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate nd the change, at annual rates,In the u.S. ONP do.
flalor fran, one period to the nest.
FromSachs [1981, p.204].-11—
Table. Medium-Term and Long-Term Debt of 94 Developing Countries, 1972—79
(In billions of U.S.dollars)
Average
Rate of
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1Change
Debt outstanding
(end ofperiod) Per cent
Public debt2 72.0 88.3 107.6 130.5 158.0 197.4 250.1 287.9 21.9
Official creditors 47.4 55.5 65.2 75.6 87.7 103.9 122.7 134.0 16.0
Private creditors 24.6 32.8 42.4 54.9 70.3 93.5 127.4 153.9 29.9
Nonguaranteed debt 19.! 23.0 27.! 36.0 44.2 468 59.6 71.6 20.8
Total 91.1 111.3 134.7 166.5 202.2 244.2 309.7 359.5 21.7
Debt service
Public debt 2 8.2 11.3 13.8 15.3 17.7 23.5 34.1 45.7 27.8
Official creditors 3.6 4.4 5.0 5.8 6.4 7.8 9.4 12.0 18.8
Private crelitors 4.6 6.9 8.8 9.5 11.3 15.7 24.7 33.7 32.9
Nonguaranteed debt 3.8 4.1 6.0 8.3 11.4 12.7 14.9 17.0 23.9
Total 12.0 IS 4 19.8 23.6 29.1 36.2 49.0 62.7 26.6
Sources: World Bank,WorldDebt Tables OECD, Development Assistance Committee; and Fund staff estimates.
Preliminary.
2Publicand publicly guaranteed debt.
FromJMF[1981], p. 5.—12—
bank) are subtracted. In many cases, the distinction of debt and other liabili-
ties is important, since equity claims offer yeilds that are contingent on eco-
nomic performance, while bonds do not, so that risks are different with alter-
native mixes of "debt" and foreign ownership of domestic capital. Often,
however, the distinction is misleading, particularly for evaluating total
foreign claims on the domestic output stream in future years. In the case of no
uncertainty, there is no legitimate distinction between the various liabilities.
Unfortunately, only data for indebtedness se are readily available.
Some of these data are shown in Tables 2 and 3.Note first the sharp rise in
D/GNP for the LDCs as a whole during the 1970s. Second, it is important to
point out that the vast majority (over 75) of total indebtedness is publicly
guaranteed by the government of the borrowing country. Even borrowing by pri-
vate corporations is typically under the aegis of the central government.
Third, there has been an enormous rise in the share of government—guaranteed
debt extended by private creditors, though both official and private creditors
played an important role in LDC financing in recent years.
The aggregate figures hide enormous variations in the borrowing behavior of
individual LDCs. The distribution of indebtedness is highly skewed, and this is
particularly true for indebtedness to private creditors. Mexico and Brazil
alone account for about 40 percent of LDC net bank liabilities, and about 25
percent of total LDC gross debt.The large borrowers, who are principally
major exporters of manufactures, rely heavily on loans from private creditors
wh:iie the poor countries, with less access to Euromarket loans, have a much
higher fraction of financing through official bilateral or multilateral cre-
dits. (See Table 4.)—13—
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International private sector credits are almost entirely in the form of
rollover, syndicated loans, with maturities of 5-10 years. These are variable
interest rate liabilities with quarterly or semi—annual interest charges fixed
at a pre—deterrnined margin (spread) over LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate).
Official credits have much longer maturities (on average in excess of twenty
years), and are usually at fixed and concessional interest rates.
Importantly, there is very little participation of the LDCs in the long—term
international bond markets. In contrast to the period before the Great
Depression when dozens of countries and the political subdivisions made exten-
sive use of the bond markets in London, Paris and New York, now there is almost
no LDC participation. As shown in Table 1, net borrowing of non—oil LDCs in the
bond market has been a small fraction of total private credits arranged in the
1970s.
Nineteenth century international debt was risky, and the market acknowledged
it as such, requiring very large risk premia on LDC loans. A striking aspect of
LDC bank debt in the 1970s has been the remarkably small spreads charged by
banks, as seen in Table 5. The difference in interest charges on loans to the
industrial versus developing countries is very small, and remarkably, there has
been very little tendency for spreads to the LDOs to widen as indebtedness grew.
The banks certainly act as if the prospects of default are small; perhaps we
will see why in the analysis that follows.—.15—
'laItle. ,%verae Spreads of Lxtcrnal Borrowing Costs over London Inter-Bank
(MTcrcd Rate, I.lflOR,1974—79
Percentagepoints
Item /974 1975 19Th/9771978/979
AIILDCs 1,13 1.68 1.72 1.551.20 0.87
Typicalindustrial country
(F:rance) 0.58 1.42 1.09 0.92 0.63 0.36
DiI[crcrice 0.55 0.27 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.5!
LII3OR rate (percent
pcryear) 11.32 7.74 6.26 6.54 9.48 12.12
Braid' 1.1 I.8 2.0 2.0 1.7 0.9
So,rcc. All diii cicci fur that on firaril are from World flank, llo,ld Drueloprr,rni R..porf, I$O,
LaNe 3.3, p. 27. lhc !lra,uI,in diii arc cited in Albert fjshlow, "Latin Amcrican Etcrnal Dcbt: Problem
or Srulu,uiont paper prcscnid at the International Seminar on Erlernal Financial Rclaiions and Their
Impact on the Latin American Economics (Santiago, Chile, March t981). l.ible 2, p. 10.
a. The 1910 value Is 1.73.—16-.
II. A Model of International Borrowing and Default
To understand the risks of sovereign lending and the role of debt
reschedulings, we must first characterize the nature of equilibrium in the
international loan markets. What determines a country's desired level of
indebtedness, or current account deficits? What indicators suggest that an eco-
nomy is on an "unsustainable" path of foreign borrowing, so that it requires
some form of policy intervention? Finally, in what sense, if any, should
sovereign borrowers pursue current account targets as a matter of macroeconomic
policy? To highlight the role of default risk, I will just briefly take up
these questions in a model without defaults, and then turn to the more
realistic model in the following part.
(a) Borrowing in a Model without Default Risk
Ignoring issues of default, the essence of "sustainability" of international
borrowing lies in the nations' intertemporal budget constraint. Consider a
world of certainty, in which lenders extend credit to agents in an economy at
interest rate r. If Q is national output, C is private consumption, I is
investment, G is government spending, and D is the level of international
indebtedness, we have:
(1) Dt+j —Dt=(Ct+It+Gt)—(Qt—rDt)
Of course, Q is GNP and Q—rD is GDP, so that Dt+i—Dt, which equals the current
account deficit, is the difference of GDP and total absorption. Defining
national savings as GDP net of private plus public consumption expenditure, St =
(Qt—rDt)—(Ct+Ct),we have the identity CAt =Dt+i—Dt
='t
—S.,where
CAt signifies the current account balance. We say that a country obeys its—17—
intertemporal budget constraint if the present value of its debt, (1+r)_tDt,
goes to zero as t approaches infinity. In this case, no creditor is left
"holding the bag" over time, with a borrower who is merely borrowing more and




(3) (1+r)1[Q._(c+I+c).]=L (1+r)_i(TB)j D(O) i=o i=O
TB signifies the trade balance, Q-C-I-G.
These expressions, then, describe the conditions for sustainable domestic
spending.According to (2), the discounted present value of total future expen-
ditures must equal the discounted present value of national output, less initial
international indebtedness. Equation (3) puts this constraint in a slightly
different perspective by recording that the discounted sum of future trade
surpluses must equal the initial indebtedness of the economy. In other words,
trade surpluses and deficits must balance over time; the question for aneconomy
is not whether to run deficits, but rather when to run them.
The optimal timing of deficits is in general a complex function of current
and future economic variables and characteristics of the economy. Speaking
broadly, three considerations dominate. First, households (or governments on
their behalf) seek to smooth consumption over time. A temporary drop in real-18-
income, say because of a crop failure or an adverse shift in the terms of trade,
will result in a smaller fall in consumption, with the more steady level of con-
sumption being supported by foreign borrowing. Second, if the market rate of
interest exceeds the social rate of time preference, the country will tend to
save today (i.e. ,runtrade surpluses) to enjoy higher consumption expenditures
in the future. Finally, if there are favorable investment opportunities given
the world cost of capital, countries will tend to run deficits today to finance
the investment expenditure. There will be a tendency to equalize the marginal
product of capital and the world interest rate.
When a country's trade deficit rises because of a fall in current income or
a drop in the world interest rate, the rise in indebtedness signals a fall in
future consumption levels, as the debt must eventually be serviced. But when a
deficit emerges becuse of an investment boom, no future consumption sacrifice is
implied. The economy is merely trading one asset, the debt instrument, for
another, the claim to physical capital. Assuming that the latter asset has a
yield at least as high as the former (which is presumably the motive for the
investment expenditure), future consumption possibilities are enhanced, not
diminished. For this obvious reason, measures of debt se tell us little
about the burdens of future debt service. We must focus separately on national
savings and investment rates to determine the sustainable future paths of
consumption.
If default is absolutely precluded, bank lending to the economy is only
restricted by thecondition that C, C, I > 0. Thus, the maximumdebt limit
DM(t)is—19--
=DM(t).
At this debt level, future absorption is restricted to zero in all periods, and
national income is fully used for debt servicing. The supply of funds schedule
is kinked at this point, with perfectly elastic credit at rate r until DM(t) j
reached, and perfectly inelastic credit supply at that level. No interest rate
will bring forth loans in excess of DM. Aithough it is a trivial case, this
kinked supply schedule illustrates that credit ceilings are fully consistent
with perfect competition in the loan market. It is simply the case that the
market value of all loans for D > DM(t) must be negative, and therefore such
loans will not be made by competitive, value—maximizing financial institutions.
In the case of perfect mobility, all domestic investments are undertaken
that have a positive present value at the prevailing world interest rate.
Importantly, and in sharp contrast to the case with potential default, a rise in
domestic savings has no effect on domestic investment rates, and therefore
results, one-for—one, in a corresponding improvement in the trade balance. We
shall see that under conditions of potential debt repudiation, a rise in savings
can actually raise domestic investment so much that the trade balance worsens,
rather than improves.
Without doubt, the perfect capital mobility assumption is seriously defi-
cient as a basis for current account analysis. There is solid evidence for
variations in risk premia on loans to sovereign borrowers, as functions of the-20-
borrowers savings and investment rates and overall debt levels. Moreover,
there j substantial anecdotal evidence that ceilings on country borrowing are
sometimes imposed in the capital markets. One theoretical response to these
complicating factors in loan supply has been to assume a supply schedule for
total borrowing, with the borrowing rate a rising function of total
indebtedness: r =f(D),f'>O. When this approach is pursued, countries become
monosopists in the world loan market, and thus have an incentive to follow par-
ticular current account policies. Since increased national indebtedness raises
borrowing costs on inframarginal as well as marginal loans, the policy authori-
ties should ration foreign borrowing (through a quota or capital inport tax) to
limit overall interest costs.
Because f(D) is arbitrarily specified rather than derived, it is likely to
be a misleading guide to loan supply. In particular, we shall see that the loan
schedule linking r and D will on domestic policies, and will therefore
not be invariant to policy changes in the borrowing country. In particular, by
raising domestic savings rates, the authorities can shift the supply schedule
outward, and thus lower borrowing costs on outstanding debt. There will, in
general, be an incentive to subsidize savings.
(b) Borrowing in a Model with Default Risk
In a series of very insightful articles, Eaton and Gersovitz describe how
the potential for sovereign default can dramatically alter our view of inter-
national capital mobility. They consider loans in a non—cooperative
environment, and argue that a loan ceiling exists for sovereign borrowing that—21 —
isdetermined by the effective retaliation that creditors can achieve in the
event of a unilateral repudiation of debt. If the possibilities for effective
retaliation are good, the debt ceiling will be high, as there is little chance
of a default. If there is no way to retaliate, the ceiling is at zero: nothing
will be lent. I examine both the non—cooperative framework and a cooperative
alternative, in which the debtor country can pre—comniit itself to a stabiliza-
tion package in order to sustain international lending.
I consider a simple framework in which loans are made in one period which
may or may not be paid back in the next. If the loan is defaulted, the creditor
retaliates with a cost to the debtor of a fraction A of national income.
A summarizes all the possible costs of retaliation: trade disruption, exclusion
from future borrowing, seizure of assets, etc. I assume that the retaliation
yeilds no utility to the creditors (or that the costs and benefits of reta-
liation cancel), only a loss to the debtor.
For a particular debtor, a given level of debt will lead to default in some
circumstances and not in others (depending on second—period income). Creditors
will demand a risk premium that depends on the probability of default, which in
turn depends on the sanctions that creditors impose in the event of default.
Because the posibilities for retaliation are limited, there are some levels of
debt that lead to default with certainty. At these debt levels, there is no
risk premium that can compensate for the default risk: an absolute ceiling of
indebtedness must be imposed by creditors when that level of indebtedness is—22—
reached. Because of the borrowing ceiling, there is no presumption that all
investments with positive present value at the world interest rate will be
undertaken. The debt ceiling will rise with stronger retaliatory measures, so
that it may be in the debtor's interest to encourage a strong response to
default, in order to raise the debt ceiling, and free up capital inflows.
The default risks can now be usefully formalized.I will start with a case
of certainty, and then move on to the case of uncertainty.
Suppose national output in periods 1 and 2 is given by Q1 and with
Q Q(K1), and K =K1,1+ I,1. The social welfare function is specified as
u(c1 ,c2) u(c1 )+u(c2)/(i + 6), where 6 is the pure rate of time reference.
National indebtedness is equal to the first—period current account deficit,
=D1,and the world safe rate of return is given by p.In the absence
of default, we have the intertemporal budget constraint C1+C2/(1+P) =
Q1-4-Q2/(1+P)—11,or C2Q2—(1+p)D1. In the no—default case, we designate C2 as
C2N. With default, there is no second-period debt servicing, but output is
reduced in proportion A CD =(i—X)Q2.The default decision depends on whether
C2D is greater than or less than C2.
Under certainty, banks will agree to make loans up to the point where the
country would choose to default, i.e. to the point where C2D is just less than
C2. We must consider two institutional arrangements, which I will label
"non—cooperative" and "cooperative," in order to determine the debt ceiling. In
the first case, which is mont unual, the loan agreement is reached between the
country and the bank before the country's policies with respect to investment—23—
andsavings in the first period are revealed. In the cooperative setting, the
country pre—counts itself to an investment—consumption plan before a loan is
arranged. In this case, the bank's loan limits can be based on the observed
first—period policies.
The term "cooperative' is used in analogy to the game—theoretic situation in
which players may bind themselves to a particular strategy (and in which the
other players recognize the binding constraint). The case in which countries
credibly promise certain policies before loans are made may or may not involve
true cooperation (in the everyday sense) between banks and the country. The
commitment may reflect the fact that certain policies are pre—set by constitu-
tional rules, or by IMF imposition, or by simple calendar constraints. We will
have more to say on the IMF role later.
Now, in either setting, the bank is safe in extending a loan as long as
C2DC2N. Since C2D =(1—A)Q2and C2N =Q2
—(1÷p)D1,the loan is safe as long
as D1 Q2/(1+p). But Q2isa function of I, so that the loan is safe as long
as D1 2(K0-i-I1)/(1-i-p)h(11), with h'>O, h"<O. LetIM(Dl)be the minimum
level of I such that D1 h(I1). A loan D1 will be safe as long as the banks
canbesure that Ij 11M(D1).
In the cooperative setting, the country announces Ii ,freeingup loans in
the amount D1 h(I1). Assuming that the borrowing constraint binds (the
interesting case for our purposes) the "planner" chooses Ii to maximize social
welfare, subject to D1 =h(11).Formally, the problem is to solve—24-
(4) =maxu(c1)+ u(c2)/(1+6)
subject to: =h(11)
C1 =Qi(Ko)+ — Ii
C2 =Q2(K0÷11)
—(1+P)D1
Implicitly, UC is a function Ii ,andthrough the borrowing constraint, a func-
tion of D1. This function is graphed in Figure 1.The optimum is attained at
D1c. (The superscript c denotes "cooperative").0
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In the non—cooperative (NC) setting, D1 is set first and thenIi and C1 are cho-
sen given D1. For given D1 ,theplanner always evaluates two courses of action,















These functions are graphed in Figure 2.Note that for D1D*, the country
will not default, while for D1 > D* it will. Obviously Di* is the credit limit
that banks will impose in the non—cooperative case. Since uNT)(D1) is rising at
D*, the country will choose to borrow up to D1*.
Since the country defaults if and only if D1 > D*, it is a direct implica-
tion that:
(6) Ii IM(D1) if and only if D1 < D*.
That is, for Dj the bank knows that investment will be sufficient to- 28-
guarantee repayment, while for D1 > D*, ft will be insufficient. Therefore, if
we super-impose 11ND and UC as in Figure 3,wefind that they touch at D*.
Otherwise UND > UC._1
Figure 3allowsup to draw the following crucial conclusions. In the non-
cooperative game, the country reaches UND(D*). In the cooperative game, it
reaches UC(D) which exceeds UND(D*). If default is entirely ruled out (e.g. by
a "world policeman"), it can reach a UND(D), which is the optimum optimorum.
The possibility of default reduces the country's utility by freezing its credit
line. Under certainty, the borrowing country should insist on high penalties
for default, for as A approaches 1, D* approaches D.
It is crucial to understand the role of cooperation in raising welfare. The
country is better off to borrow D and invest IC(D) than to borrow D* and invest
IND(D*). But if given the chance to borrow D it prefers to invest less, ID(D) <
Ic(D), and to default. Thus, without a commitment by the country to maintain a
high level of investment, the bank will not lend D.
The importance of the cooperative regime is even more striking when the
country enters the "first" period with pre—existing indebtedness, which we will
denote as D0. With initial debt the planner's problem is slightly changed. In
















A of the Non_Cooperjand Cooperative So1utjo-30-
(Itis actually possible that D0 > h(11) for all I, in which case a cooperative












Again,let be the cut-off point such that the country defaults if first—
period band D1 exceed Dj. It is possible that D0 is sufficiently high so
that Dp =0,(in other words the country simplyl plans to default in the
second period, no matter how much it is loaned in the first period).
Suppose that (a) DDO* =0;and (b) a cooperative solution exists. The graph
of this situation is shown in Figure 4. This is precisely the Prisoner's dilemma
alluded to in the introduction. In the non—cooperative case the bank loans noth-







Figure 4. ThePrioner'1)i1ernmiinInternational Loans—32—
making both the bank and the country off (since UC(D1) > UD(O)). The coopera-
tive agreement would pre-commit the country to a substantial investment program.
Again, if the country is absolutely barred from default it can reach uN1)(D),
which exceeds UC(D) and UD(O).
There is another important problem that can occur in financial markets that
we must consider. Suppose that banks refuse to issue loans to the country in
the first period, even though there is a range of debt for which the country
would re—pay its loan. Since a loan freeze is part of the penalty, embodidied
in A, that attaches to a default, a unilateral freeze on loans reduces the net
penalty associated with default, and makes default more likely. Formally, a
freeze on credit reduces UND(O) relative to UD(O); with UD(O) > u(o) the
country will choose to default. In this sense, a loan freeze by banks in
response to a worry about default can be self—fulfilling.
It is important to supplement this analysis with uncertainty, for two
reasons. First, it is only through unexpected events that a bank gets trapped
holding the bad debt of a sovereign borrower; only with uncertainty (or
irrationality) will defaults actually occur. Second, under uncertainty the
default option becomes a vehicle for the banks to assume some of the risk of LDC
investment projects. It may provide an imperfect form of insurance in a world
with incomplete financial markets. I am now carrying out a detailed study of
defaults under uncertainty in a many—period model, and I just touch on the high—
lights of that analysis now.—33-
Once uncertainty is added to the model, we find that creditors (assumed to
be risk neutral) will make loans with a positive probability of default, as long
as there exists an interest rate premium that can compensate for the risk. In
this case, changes in the penalty for default, A, affect not only the credit
ceiling on loans, but also the risk characteristics of investments from the
point of view of both debtor and creditor. Under uncertainty, high penalities
for default make the borrower better off, by raising the country's credit
ceiling. Under certainty, higher penalties may actually lower the country's
welfare. Though the ability to borrow is enhanced, the 9insurance" aspect of
defaults is diminished, since the penalties for default become more severe.
Thus, the E[U(C1 ,c2)] may fall (E denotes "expectation"). In general there will
be an optimal A for the debtor country, for which E[U(C1 ,c2)] is maximized sub-
ject to the constraint that risk neutral creditors achieve the expected yield
p. Along with A there is an optimal non-zero probability of default, 11*.
Theusefuliness of default as a risk-spreading mechanism depends on the
alternative financial assets that are available to the debtor country. For
instance, if the investment returns depend on easily identifiable exogenous
conditions (e.g. weather), there may well be an insurance market available to
reduce or eliminate risk (for example, hurricane insurance is commonly held by
many Carribean countries).More typically, insurance will not be available
for investment where:(1) the ex post returns to investment are not easily
monitored; or (2) where unmonitored inputs, e.g. labor effort, play an important
role in the production process, so that moral hazard precludes full insurance of
the project. For similar reasons, foreign equity participation in the invest-
ment projects may be unachievable.—34—
In these cases, default can be important. Of course, defaults provide a
very imperfect mechanism for diversifying risk, since the retaliation which
follows a default is pareto inefficient (the debtor loses 2' while the credi-
tor welfare, by assumption, is unchanged). Recontracting in the event of
default may not be a viable option for restoring pareto efficient outcomes
moreover, especially if the creditor is unable to verify whether the investment
project in fact failed. Because of the inefficiency of default, the debtor
country will remain with substantial risks even under optimal contracts with
default allowances.
From a regulatory perspective, then, the interesting question is how
E[U(C1 ,c2)] and the probability of default vary with the costs of default A.Do
we perform a service to would-be borrowers by constraining their default option?
Does raising A necessarily reduce the probability of default? In general, there
is a welfare tradeoff in raising A:credit ceilings rise, but so do the risks
of physical investment for the debtor. There may well exist an interior optimum
for A.Interestingly, the probability of default is not necessarily a strictly
decreasing function of A.This is because a rise in A tends to increase total
indebtedness, and thus the benefits of default as well as the costs.
Now we turn to the historical evidence on defaults, where we shall see the
relevance of the preceeding theoretical analysis.—35—
III. Defaults in Historical Perspective
The concern over LDC debt is anything but new. The history of international
capital movements since at least the early 1gth century is characterized by
large scale borrowing of developing regions, and large scale defaults. Many of
the same debates over prudential standards, government guarantees of foreign
loans, rescheduling of debt, and so forth, have been pursued for 150 years. And
evenmany of the actors have remained the same. A number of Latin American
countries that are still among the most problematic for foreign loans first
entered the London bond market upon independence in 1822—25, and defaulted soon
after, setting in train a hundred years of alternating solvency and default. It
is good to keep in mind, though, one actor whose perspective has changed: the
United States shifted from the world's greatest recipient of capital inflows in
the 1gth century to its greatest creditor in the next, and in the process has
been both perpetrator and victim of sovereign defaults.
The striking comparison of pre—1930 and post—1945 international lending lies
not in scale or even sophistication, but in the changing "rules of the game." In
both periods, the experience is rich, tangled, and contradictory, and governing
rules have always involved inexact and evolving standards. Nonetheless certain
broad generalizations are possible. In the earlier period, defaults were a
recurrentphenomenom, across countries and over time. Many countries defaulted
on debt as many as five times in the course of the nineteenth century. Defaults
were typically settled in negotiation with private bondholder committees, on
terms which rarely preserved more than a small fraction of the capital value of—36—
the original asset. After this partial repayment of debt, the debtor country
was typically free to resume borrowing on the international exchanges, subject
of course to high risk prernia on its debt. Contrary to the popular image of
British or American gunboats bearing down on delinquent debtors, true only in a
few such spectacular episodes, governments were usually very reserved in debtor—
creditor conflicts. The British government rarely allowed its foreign policy
goals to be dictated by the fortunes and misfortunes of British financiers.
Only in cases where private and foreign policy goals closely coincided, as in
mid—nineteenth century Egypt and Turkey, did Britain ride the debt situation for
larger political ends, ending up with no less than sovereignty in Egypt (1882)
for its efforts.
The post—1945 period has thus far operated on a very different basis. At
least until the late 1960s, the great bulk of LDC debt (excluding foreign direct
investment) was in the form of official bilateral or multilateral loans, or
government—guaranteed suppliers credits, often on concessional terms. Thus,
debt problems directly involved creditor governments, rather than the private
market alone. rpically, debt service problems with official creditors have
been handled in negotiations between the debtor country and a multilateral nego-
tiating body of creditor governments, most often in the so—called Paris Club.
In this forum, creditor governments have often acceded to debt restructuring,
grace periods on loan amortizations, and lengthened maturities, but in strong
contrast to the earlier experience, have almost never allowed for an explicit
reduction in the principal owed or interest due.Of course, some of the diff——37—
erence with the earlier period is more apparent than real, for when interest
rates are already on a concessional basis, a lengthening of debt maturities
amounts to a reduction in the market value of liabilities.
Since the re—emergence of large scale private lending, the private creditors
have even more strongly resisted the substitution of debt relief for debt
rescheduling. In nosense is private debt rescheduling merely a polite phrase
for default, as many observers have suggested. The essence of the reschedulings
has been the preservation of the capital value of outstanding debt. While in
the l9th century, a default settlement often included a conversion of the
defaulted bonds to new bonds (at par) with a reduced coupon rate, in the recent
period, the debt reschedulings have often included an increase in interest rates
on the outstanding debt, to compensate creditors for the greater risk of the
extended maturaties and the transactions costs of rescheduling. Moreover,
arrearages and delinquencies on debt payments are capitalized and added to the
liabilities of the debtor. Assuming that the rescheduled debt is not ultimately
defaulted, the private creditors apparently suffer only small if any capital
losses in the great bulk of debt reshedulings.
To a great extent, the difference in pre-1945 and post—1945 experience is
the difference in non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes. There was no formal
mechanism available for a debtor country to commit itself to particular behavior
in return for a loan agreement. The only contract between debtors and
bondholders occurred after a default, in order to reach a settlement on the
outstanding claims. After World War II, the creditor clubs and ad-hoc commit-
tees of bank representatives have repreatedly negotiated with debtor countries-38-
on the verge of default. Moreover the IMF has played the role of arbiter, in
designing stabilization programs for the debtor country that provide the basis
for pareto—improving cooperative agreements with private and official creditors.
We should not suppose that the stabilization programs are therefore gladly
endorsed by the debtor country. The programs have indeed been economically and
politically painful ——butstill less painful than outright defaults.
In the following few pages, I pursue this contrast in historical experience,
focussing on some structural features, such as bond versus bank debt, official
versus private credit, and the role of the IMF, that might help to explain the
historical shift.—39—
(a)Defaults before World War II: Causes and Remedies
Table 6 presents a sampling of sovereign defaults until World War II, to
illustrate thier frequency and scope. That defaults were a noiirial and accepted
part of the financial system can be judged by two facts: (i) a default in one
country typically did little to interfere with the flow of' capital to other
LDCs; and (2) a default usually resulted, after several years, in a formal settle-
ment with bondholders that allowed renewed large—scale borrowing by the debtor.
Almost all of the publically—held liabilities of the borrowing countries in this
period were in the form of long—term publically—held bonds rather than bank
debt. The principal role of the great banking houses in developing-country
finance was in underwriting debt, and so defaults rarely had the direct effect
of bringing down a banking house. The Baring crisis of 1890 is the stunning
exception to the rule, which shows that underwriting itself can be a dangerous
business. When an 1888 loan for Argentina was cooly received in the bond
market, the Baring Brothers "felt obliged to lend to Argentina through accep-
tance credits. Falling raw material prices in 1890 made it impossible for the
Argentine government to meet these credits as they came due," and the great
banking house itself succumbed to bankruptcy. (See Kindleberger [1978]).
An illustration —inthe extreme —ofthe default cycle that characterized
many 19th century countries is provided by Winkler [1933] for the case of
Guatemala, which I reproduce in Table 7. Far from a permanent bar to flota-
tion of new debt issues, Guatemalan defaults were regularly renegotiated to per-
mit new borrowing. And though it may appear that bond—holders acted irra——40—
Table 6
Periods of Sovereign Default,
1820—1932: Some Examples
Mexico 1827—1870, i9li—end of period
Peru 18251819, 1816—1889, 1931—end of period
Venezuela 1834_18141, 1817_1859, 1864—1876, i88—i88o, 1892—1893,
1897—1905
Greece 1827—1878, 1893—1898, 1932—end of period
Portugal 1837—1856, 1892—1902
Turkey 1875—1881, 1930—end of period
Ept 1876—1881
Note: Thedatesare representative of major demarcations between credit-
worthiness and default. Within many of' the intervals, settlements were
reached with creidtors which restored creditworthiness for a brief
period, but which collapsed shortly thereafter.
Sources: See Bouchard 11951] and rnne 11951] in particular, but also Feis
(1930], ?bdden, Nadler and Sauvain (1937], Kindleberger 119781, and
Winkler (19331 for further examples.
I.—41--
Table 7
The History of Guatemalan Debt, 1825_1928*
1825 First loanof £163,ooo to Central American Federa-
tioncontracted at percent,bearing interest at
6 per cent per annum.
1827 Guatemala assumes 5/I2thofdebt, or 167,900.
1828—55 Default.
1856Settlement on basis of loan and arrears being con-
verted into £loo,ooo 5's; Guatemala recognizes
3/3rd of original debt, or £54,433. Interest ifl ar-
rears estimated and cut down to 145,567. 50 per
cent of customs given as security.
1863Private loan of £xx,3oo for construction arranged in
London.
1864 Loanof1863 defaulted.
3869 Loancontractedfor £5oo.ooo at 70—3/2 per cent, bear-
ing interest at 6 per cent per annum. Sinking fund
of 3 per cent per annum. Import duties given as
security.
1876All loans defaulted.
1878 1/3interest due April i, 3876 on 1869 loan, paid
in November 1878.
1884Settlement made. Because of political disturbances,
agreement not carried out.
1887 Loans of i86 and 1869 and back interest funded into
new 4 per cent loan; sinking fund of 3/2 per cent
applied to semi-annual drawings at par; secured
on duties levied on each package of foreign mer-
chandise that may be imported into country through
any of ports, also on maritime revenues; payments
made to a committee composed of representatives
of foreign bonds, internal bonds and railways. Im-
porters to pay pledged revenues to committee.
1888 Terms of 1887 accepted and 1922,700 of 4 per cent
loan created as follows: Iwo of iSç6 loan and
back interest amounting to 162/1/8 exchanged for
114.4/14 new 4'S; Iwo of 1869 and 172/30 interest
for 1152/4;Iwoof 1863 loan and 119/31/8 in-
terest for £ij/14 of new 4's. Internal debt settled
on basis similar to foreign debt.
1894 All loans default and committee suspended.
1895 Newarrangement:Internal and external debt ex-
changed into £i,6oo,ooonew4'S; hoc ofi888
loanexchanged for £75 new bonds. Internals at
rate of ISo ($500) for £75 new 4's; non-cumula-
tive sinking fund of £15,ooo to purchase bonds.
Secured by special tax of 6s per quintal of coffee
exported ; proceeds paid to agents of bondholders.
1895—96 Negotiations for new loan of £68.oo with Hamburg
bankers; secured on excess of coffee warrants after
providing for external debt. These new terms were
drawn up without consultation with Council.—42—
1897New arrangement with German bankers, againwith-
out consulting Council of ForeignBondholders.
1898Duty on coffee, which had been"irrevocably fixed" is
reduced—new agreement reached providingfor pay-
ment of interest on external debt at rateof 2 per
cent in cash for 3 years, and 2 per centin certifi-
cates which were to be exchangedfor 4 per cent
bonds after June 30, 1901.
ISQ'3Coffee duty again reduced_subsequentlyraised.
iooContract of 195 again violated.
1901—02 New agreement providesfor payment of interest due
December 1902 and June 1903 at rateof I/2 per
cent and of later coupons at rateof 3 per cent.
Arrears funded into new bonds; as security,all cus-
toms are pledged. Congress somutilated terms
that Committee did not submit it toholders.
1903New agreement; as security Government gives 30 per
centof import duty, payable in gold. Agreement
not ratified by Government; export dutyon coffee
changed again.
1904Newagreementprovides for issuance of newbonds
withinterest at rate of iper cent in 1905; 2 per
cent in1906; and 3 per cent thereafter.Govern-
ment refuses to ratify agreement.
1903—08 Agreement reached withAmerican Syndicate which
made advances against coffee exportduties and im-
port duties payable in gold.Documents deposited
with American Legation in Guatemalaand holders
given right to ask American Governmentfor pro-
tection in case of violation of ternis byGuatemala—
thus, special security of 1895 is assignedto others.
1908New agreement with American syndicatefor $,ooo,-
000 loan.
1912 Coffeeduty established at original rate.
1913Arrangementof 1895resumedon following terms:
Government todeliver to bondholders warrants for
payment of coffee export duties enoughto cover
interest for 3913-14 in exchange for certificates
of i898, Government issues £29,656, 4'Sfor back
coupons. Deferred certificates wereissued with no
interest. At end of 4 years, bondholders wereto
deal with Government regarding thesecertificates.
1917Sinking fund not resumed as providedfor in 1913
Agreement.
1919Resumption of sinking fund.
1924Railway loan of $3,000,000 contracted at8 per cent.
1925Additional tax imposed on coffee exported.
1927Railway bonds issued to the amountof $1,950,000 at
8per cent per annum.
1928External loan of $2,515,000 issued at 8 per cent per
annum. New 4percent external loan for I8.,6o3
issued to take care ofdeferredinterest certificates
of 1913.
*Reproducedfrotn M. Winkler, Foreign Bonds: An Autopsy, (Roland Swain Company:
Philadelphia, 1933), pp. 41—44.—43-
tionallyin continuing to hold Guatemalan debt, it must be stressed that these
assets carried an enormous risk premium, with yields—to—maturity often 500 basis
points above British government consols. Indeed, without a careful calculation
it is difficult to know whether the realized return on a century of Guatemalan
debt exceeded or fell short of the return on safe assets, even with the history
of repeated default.
There is no simple set of factors that underlay most defaults in the early
period, with the history recording cases of flagrant economic mismanagement,
external shocks (e.g. terms—of—trade deterioration), war and war indemnities,
crop failures, and failed investment schemes, as proximate causes of default.
Kindleberger [1978] notes that the least successful loans were those undertaken
to maintain real consumption levels in the event of external shocks to income,
and that foreign borrowing to match a rise in domestic investment tended to fare
more favorably. He also adds, however, that "productive loans in the developing
countries are not very productive," so •that the distinction between government
consumption and investment expenditure is not as sharp as might be supposed.
The classic case of "consumption loans" are debts to finance war
indemnities, as in the Davies and Young Loans to finance German reparations
after WWI. An indemnity requires a pure income transfer, which must be matched
by a decline in consumption relative to income. A loan may be undertaken to
smooth the required consumption decline over time. Effectively the loan is
financing a short—term decline in the national savings rate, on the presumption—44-
that the savings rate will rise later. But, as we shall see, a drop in the
national savings rate is a strong predictor of rising default probabilities.
Loans to finance military expenditure or to wage war have the same risky
character, and help to explain the widespread defaults during the 1820s of a
number of newly-independent Latin American countries.
Borrowing to finance consumption or military expenditure is no guarantee of
default. Indeed, creditors must expect a high enough probability of debt
repayment that when coupled with the risk premium7 the expected rate of return
on the loan at least matches the return on safe assets. Exogenous shocks, at
least partially unanticipated, must precipitate the default decision, unless
creditors simply misjudge the debtor's intentions or economic position. The
triggering event is often external, such as a recession in the developed
countries that reduces export demand and the debtor's terms of trade. As
Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain [1937] (hereafter MNs) point out, "During the nine-
teenth century, every major downward swing of the business cycle caused the
failure of governments and other foreign borrowers to meet their external
obligations." (p.107) The links of business cycles and default hold clearly in
the 1830s, 1870s, and 1890s. Alternatively, an individual country may
experience a terms—of-trade shock, such as when the spread of artificial fer-
tilizers substantially reduced the price of Peruvian guano, thus contributing to
Peru's default in 1876.
The most significant of all default episodes, in magnitude and in intellec-
tual and institutional legacy, occurred in 1931—32 in the depths of the Great
Depression. Its lessons are still relevant to us for several reasons.—45—
The defaults occurred at a time when much of the banking community and public
had become convinced that default risk was a thing of the past, and so it
is a good antidote to such facile thinking today. Just as in our defaultless
era, "Investors in foreign bonds had not suffered any losses for a long time; on
the contrary, they had repeatedly made sizable profits. This pleasant state
came to be regardedasnormal; investors assumed that the world had entered a
periodofpermanent, defaultless prosperity."IMore importantly, the episode—
points up one of the potential sources of hazard in international capital
mobility: a speculative rush from foreign bonds with no international lender
of last resort or forum for debt rescheduling. To explore this episode, it is
useful first to survey the wreckage. On the New York bond market alone, some or
all of the obligations (including national, provincial, and municipal entities)
of no less than fifteen Latin American countries, thirteen European countries,
China and Canada were in default in 1935 (MNs, pp. 308—318).Approximately 39
percent of the par value of all foreign bonds on the New York exchange were in
default at the end of that year (MNS, p. 123).On all of the world's exchanges
defaults totalled about $22.4 billion at the beginning of 1934 (Winkler [1933],
p. xii). So much for America's first large—scale involvement as a major world
creditor!
A major part of the default mechanism in 1931—32 is typical: the depression
in the developed countries sharply reduced the terms of trade of primary pro-
ducing regions, substantially raising the real value of the debt in terms of
national, incomes throughout. theworld.As in earlier business cycles, defaults—46-
wereto be expected, and certainly in greater magnitude in 1931—32 than earlier,
given the severity of the cycle.
Moreover, the incentives to remain solvent also fell. Since the costs of
default include a squeeze on trade flows and an exclusion from foreign
borrowing, an exogenous reduction in trade or an inability to borrow even
without defaulting can lower the incentive to maintain debt servicing. Both
events seem to have occurred in 1930, about six months ppr to the onset of
widespread defaults. The declines in income in the U.S. and Europe had already
reduced agricultural prices in the primary production regions. On top of this
shock came rising trade protectionism in the U.S. and then elsewhere. The
Smoot—Rawley Tariff of June, 1930, provided another blow to the terms oftrade
of the developing countries.More importantly, the capital markets appear to
have"shut down" to the developing countries after mid—i 930. While $________
billionof foreign debt was floated from January to June, 1930, there was not a
singleforeign issue, outside of Canadian borrowing, from that date on.The
foreign defaults, led by Bolivia, began six months later on January 1, 1931.
Bolivia was soon followed in sequence by Peru, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and a
dozen other Latin American countries.
The restriction on foreign borrowing is clearly related to a sharp rise in the
perceived risk of foreign loans. Risk spreads on foreign debt widened enor-
mously in the second half of 1930, as shown in Figure 1. Political violencein
Brazil was greeted by investors with panic concerning all Latin American issues,
and Latin American bond prices fell up to fifty percent in the course of a
single week (October 3-10, 1930), as shown by the following examples:IVI ui I y'i Dond V icI(I Avcriby Rn I in g
40 FrHgn Bonds CiI!:1 rd with I ugh Grade 1)nmcLic
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Closing Price Closing Price
October 3 October 10
Argentine 6s 95 54 7/8
Bolivia Ss 76 3/4 66
Brazil 73 481/2
Chile 6s 831/2 71
Colombia 6s 66 5/8 58
Uruguay 101 88
Source: Financial Chronicle, Vol. 131, P. 2264, 1930
Once the defaults began there was no return. The market environment during
1931 is vividly described in the Financial Chronice (January 16, 1932):
Foreign obligations, both on behalf of governments and on behalf of cor-
porations, were under taboo all through the year. The financial upheaval
through which Europe was passing appeared to have put a complete embargo
upon flotations of that description. This was long before the suspension of
gold payments by Great Britain and several other countries in September. No
foreign government issues of any kind were placed in the United States
during 1931 with the exception of $50,422,000 of Canadian municipal issues,
and these latter, too, became out of the question when the Canadian dollar
suffered such heavy depreciation following the action of Great Britain in
passing off the gold standard.
Admittedly, it is very hard to judge whether the market reaction was a
rational response to a fait accompli of widespread default, or whether the panic
itself brought on the default. In markets with multiple equilibria and self—
fulfilling prophecy, a complete structural model is necessary to find out "what
might have been." But since the panic selling of all Latin American bonds seems
to have occurred in response to bad news concerning only one debtor, it appears
that imperfect information and a bandwagon effect played a vital role in the
default process. In either interpretation, the market fell into the no—loan cum—49-
defaultbox in the creditor—debitor game described in the introduction.
The remedies to default were as varied as the causes in the period before
World War II. Most typically, the default was followed after a number ofyears
by a negotiated settlement between the defaulting government and a private
bondholders' committee. In more spectacular cases, military intervention was
occassionally threatened or pursued, as when Germany, Great Britain and Italy
blockaded Venezuela in 1902—03. Not only did the intervention succeed in
restoring debt service payments, but an arbitration in the Hague in 1904
awarded priority to the intervening countries over other claimants (including
the U.S., France, Holland, Belgium, and Spain) on the theory "thatthey had
incurred the expenses of an intervention which resulted in benefits to others
as well."The rewards of a job well done! Ten to twenty years leater, the
U.S. was active militarily throughout the region in customs house seizures to
guarantee debt servicing. The most spectacular of all interventions resulted in
loss of sovereignty of the debtor country, as when France installed Maximillian
Mexican Emporer in 1861 after a joint military operation with Britain and Spain.
The British occupation of Egypt (1881—1907) followed joint attempts of Britain
and France to enforce Khedival debt obligations.
Most authorities concur, however, that "It cannot be said that military
action in support of bondholders is now or ever was an important phase of inter-
national relations," (Borchard, p. 269).J' Much more frequently, governments
of private creditors did not interfere in default claims, except to prevent
discrimination by the defaulting country in favor of creditors of another
country. Private bondholders committees carried the burden of negotiation with
the defaulting countries. Their main weapon was their power to enforce the-50-
exclusionof new debt flotations on the national stock exchanges. More
occassionally, the bonds themselves carried explicit default provisions, e.g.
for arbitration or collateral. Even more rarely, countries have acceded to
foreign control or supervision of customs receipts, etc. in additionto exclu-
sions of further borrowing.
Given these coercive devices, defaults were almost always followed by nego-
tiation between creditors and debtors. A hallmark of such negotiations was an
evaluationof the debtor' s "capacity to pay", in order to determine a degree of
debt forgiveness for the defaulting country (see Cizauskas [1978]).Mostfre-
quently, existing debt was consolidated and extended, with a significantreduc-
tion in interest and principal due. Interest arrearages were often totally
forgiven in the new debt package. Dozens of examples of thesesettlements may
be found in Borchard, .cit.,p. 323—330. More novel types ofsettlements
also merit mention. The Peruvian debt from loans of 1869, 1870,and 1872, was
forgiven in return for franchises to the operation ofrailroad and steamboats in
Peru, and to certain rights in grain production. Bondholders wereassigned pro—
rata share in a newly created Peruvian Corporation that tookcontrol of these
assets.—51—
(b) The Debt Situ?&tion Since 1945: Reschedulings in Lieu of Default
The period since World War II must be divided into an early and recent
phase. The legacy of the Great Depression defaults sharply restricted the
access of developing countries to the private capital markets until the late
1960s. Capital flows until that time were dominated by development loans of
multilateral agencies (usually concessional) and supplier credits typically
guaranteed by export—import agencies of the creditor countries. There was no
shortage of debt difficulties in this period, even with the far more limited
scope of loans. But there were also no defaultsGovernments acting in ad hoc
multilateral creditor groups, alongside of the Ir4F, used both positive incen-
tives and threats to avert defaults, now viewed by the leading nations as a
major threat to world economic stability.
From its inception in the early 1950s, the "creditor club" mechanism has
offered debtor countries the prospect of debt rescheduling and extended debt
maturities in exchange for commitments to a stabilization program to alleviate
the debt difficulties. As shown in Table 8, there have been 47 creditor
reschedulings, involving 16 countries, during 1946—1980. The stabilization
programs that underlie the reschedulings are almost always negotiated between
the debtor country and the IMF, and allow the debtor to draw loans for balance—
of—payments support at concessional rates (technically, the country borrows from
its "upper tranche' credits at the IMF, once a stabilization program is
approved.)
Both as to the nature of credit relief and the form of the stabilization
program, there are consistent patterns that have emerged over time (see IMF—53—
[1980a, 1980b] for discussion). The agreements cover debt falling due within a
specified consolidation period (usually 1 or 2 years within the date of the
rescheduling), and most or all of that debt is rescheduled (or rolled over).
Typically the consolidation period includes three intervals: a period prior to
rescheduling for which debt payments are in arrears; a period in the future
during which debt is unconditionally rescheduled; and a follow—up period, for
which the debt will be rescheduled conditional on the successful completion of
an IMF stabilization program. Frequently, a grace period is allowed, in which
no interest or amortization is required. Interest arrearages are not forgiven,
though they too may be consolidated into new debt obligations. The interest
rate on restructured debt is generally left to be negotiated bilaterally between
the debtor and creditor countries.
The IMF stabilization programs that underlie the debt rescheduling are simi-
larly systematic, and are far more controversial. As described by Guitian, for
example, the stabilization programs typically focus on three factors: a reduc-
tion in domestic credit creation, a cut in fiscal expenditure (in part to sup-
port the first objective), and a restoration of price incentives in controlled
sectors of the economy. The last plank has two purposes: to increase efficiency
of production generally, and to relieve claims on the budget in the form of sub-
sidies to commodities subject to controlled prices. This set of policy
prescriptions has been strongly attacked by many academic economists. We will
examine the efficacy of the programs likely in the final section of the paper.
The list of official debt rescheduling records that many countries par-
ticipate repeatedly in the Paris Club process. This reflects the narrow con——53—
solidationperiod of rescheduled debt, and not any evidence that the earlier
stabilization programs have been unsuccessful. The consolidation period is kept
short at provide automatically for periodic review of the stabilization efforts.
With the very sharp increase in private sector loans to the LDCs, a substan-
tially more complex environment has emerged. The vulnerability of private debt
depends importantly on public sector behavior, and vice versa, so that strategic
behavior of the debtor countries, the official creditors, the IMF, and the banks
all are interconnected in a complicated game. As one example of this, each
creditor is concerned that rescheduled debt not be used merely to pay off the
debts of other creditors. The Paris Club regularly requires that a debtor
country that reschedules debts to official creditors undertake to reschedule
debt to private creditors on comparable terms. The public creditors attempt to
prevent the debtor from using the Paris Club rescheduling merely to pay off its
private sector debt.
The recent history of private capital market transactions shows clearly that
banks sacrifice little if anything in asset values in multilateral debt
rescheduling. The lesson of the Paris Club is even more decisively true for the
private banks: reschedulings are not defaults, in that they convey no debt
relief except with regard to maturity structure. With respect to outright debt
repudiation, North Korea provides the only case involving private credit
in the post—war period.
While we do not have as much public information about private credit resche—
dulings as we do about theParisclub undertakings, recent experiences for
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, Sudan, Turkey, and Zaire between 1975 and 1980 allow
some general points to be made. Most importantly, credit availability to the—54—
countriesfell when expansionary domestic policies and often external shocks led
to a significant fall in national saving rates. For most of these countries,
service payments fell into arrears before the rescheduling, and the private
renchedulings ere preceded by Paris Club negotiations. In the private
reschedulings, the debt restructuring itself provided for grace periods of about
three years and total maturities of five to seven years. Interest rates were at
spreads of 1 3/4— 2percentage points above LIBOR. Importantly, in most cases,
the implementation of the rescheduling was made contingent upon successful per-
formance under an IMP Stabilization plan.
It is often asserted that banks are too reluctant to declare defaults, and
that they allow bad debts to accumulate in order to avoid a debt repudiation.
The combination of debt rescheduling and IMP stabilization program can in prin-
cipal allow the banks to walk the line between default and uncheckeddebt
accumulation. We will investigate in Section IV whether the programs have
indeed been successful in their assigned task.
The IMP seems to provide a crucial ingredient in arrangeing a cooperative
settlement between creditors and debtors. It remains an open question whether
such agreements could be directly reached between the banks and country, without
the involvement of an outside institution. The answer seems to be "no," for
commercial bankers are very wary of undertaking the kind of bargaining and moni-
toring roles that are central to the IMP. The case of Peru in the mid—1970s
provides a case in point, for the banks and Peru tried unsuccessfully to mimic
an IMP programwithout the IMF.The experiment was a debacle, and eventually
theIMFhad to enter the scene.—55—
Cline [1981, Pp. 305—306] has described this case in some detail:
In March 1976 the Bermudez government sought a large balance.-
of—payments loan from major U.S. banks, without a prior IMF
standby agreement. The government felt that agreeing to IMF
conditions would be unacceptable politically, although in its
discussion with the banks, the government proposed a program
very much like that which might have secured IMF support.
Partly out of fear of a more liftist coup if Bermudez lost
power, the banks eventually agreed, but only after the regime
demonstrated willingness to take unpopular stabilization
measures...
The program called for an initial $200 million in loans with
a second $200 million to follow after several months, con-
tingent on government adherence to the policy purchase.
Signed only by the end of 1976, the package soon demonstrated
the frailty of such direct intervention by banks; for reasons
of data availability, technical capacity, and political sen-
sitivity, it proved impossible for the banks to enforce their
lending conditions, and adverse publicity for the interven-
tion (plus its ineffectiveness) caused the leading banks to
resolve that they would not become entangled in similar
packages in the future but would rely on the IMF as the moni-
toring authority.—56—
IV.Prospectsfor LDC Debt in the 1980s
In light of our theoretical and historical discussion, there are three prin-
cipal concerns that surround the current debt situation. First, is the threat
that Kindleberger [1977] raises that "the problem of developing—country debt today
is that the proceeds of loans of developing countries, and even of Britain,
France and Italy in the last 3l,years, have been used to finance consumption and
that the recycling has postponed default but cannot be continued indefinately."
(1977, p. 14). He argues that the "analor of [oil recycling] with reparations
recycling is exact," since both involve a fall in savings rates to avoid a
necessary fall in real consumption standards, and then reminds us of the fate of
reparations loans. In this gloomy view, we would predict in the coming years
eitherexplicit defaults or a steady accumulation of bad debt by banks, who
continue to loan out of fear of a default.
A second potential concern lies on the opposite end: that the costs of
defaults are so large and the effectiveness of debt renchedulings and stabiliza-
tion programs so consistent, that many LDCs are forced to bear extraordinary,
and unwarranted risks in the development process. Should defaults or debt
relief be encouraged by policy authorities in some cases?
Third, there is the risk that credit suppply to the LDCs might suddenly
shrink because of a bank failure, an isolated default, a coup, etc., with the
result of provoking a chain of further defaults and panic. Is the cooperative
mechanism strong enough to prevent a clamp—down on foreign loans?
The concern over "consumption loans" to finance oil imports seems not to be—57—
warranted for the LDCs as a whole, during 1973-78.While the timing of sharp
rises in LDC indebtedness certainly coresponds to the oil price hikes, there is
no logical corollary that the debt is therefore paying for oil imports. Indeed,
as I pointed out elsewhere (Sachs, 1981), the current account deficits for
non-OPEC, oil—exporting developing countries rose at least as much relative to
GD? as for oil—importing developing countries (Table 9)!Indeed, the debt/GNP
ratio for middle—income oil-exporters (excluding Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya and
Kuwait) rose from 10.9 percent in 1970 to 24.5 percent in 1980, while it rose
from 10.2 percent to only 14.8 percent for the middle-income importers. The LDC
debt problem is not neatly explained by oil import dependence.
One clue as to the LDC adjustment process is provided in Table 10, from the
World Bank. The oil—importing LDCs responded to the rise in fuel prices by
compressing non-oil imports as a percentage of GD? and expanding exports.
Incredibally, Brazil held the dollar value of merchandize imports flat for four
years after the oil price increase. In strong contrast to the Kindleberger
position, savings rates actually rose in the period. (If the inflation—
correction mentionned on p. 9 is used to adjust the savings data, savings rates
would rise even more strongly than in Table io.)
The large deficits of the middle—income developing countries arose in this
period because very large increases in investment rates exceeded more moderate
increases in savings rates, and not because of a fall in savings rates per se.
In the aggregate for nine large LDC debtors, the savings-investment relations
were as follows (from Sachs, 1981, p. 235):—58-
TaMe 9 Current Account asa Percentageof GrossDomestic Product, NonollLDCs,
1973—79
Category /973 1974 1975 /976 /977 1978/979
Net oil-importing
countries —1.9 —5.4—5.7 —3.7 —2.8—3.1—4.0
Net oil-exporting
countrlcs —2.9 —4.4 —7.1—4.9 —4.4—4.2—3.3
All nonoil LDCs —2.0 —5.2 —6.0 —3.9 —3.0 —3.2 —4.0
Sourcc: IMF A,nw1t Rrpof, 19Pfl. tablc 9, p. 30.
a. FLibrain. flotiia. Ihc Congo, Ecuador, Egypt. Gabon. Matayaia. Mesico, Peru. the Syrian Arab
Rcpubtic, Trinidad, Tobago, and Tunisia.—59—
Table1 O.Performance indicators, oil-importing
developing countries, 1970—90
(prrceltagr cf GDP)
lien, 1970 7975 1978 1980
Cp,,cla,,p (1978) r:ccs
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The investment boom, and a matching decline in the OECD, led to a hefty shift in
the locus of world investment, as shown in Table 11. This high rate of capital
formation helped to fuel the rapid growth of the middle—income LDCs throughout
the 1970s.
Of course, it is not fortuitous that the big debtor countries maintained
high savings rates in this period. To a large extent, the high savings rates
permitted these countries to continue to borrow heavily on the international
market, for the reasons explored in the previous section. In many cases, with
Brazil the best known, large scale borrowing in fact followed upon significant
domestic financial reforms that raised home savings rates (domestic savings rose
from 21.1 during 1960-64, to 21.8 during 1965—69, to 23.8 during 1970—74, before
slipping back to 21.3 for 1975—77, following the oil shock). Mexico,
Phillipines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand among the large nine borrowers,
had large increases in savings rates after the 1973 oil shock (comparing 1965—73
and 1974—79).(See Sachs [1981], pp. 234—235.)—61—
Table lfixed In'.estmcnt and GNP, jor Regins,SelectedYears, 1960—78
Percent unless otherwise specified
hem /960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
InveslmcntofLDCs(hullionsofU.Sdollars) 8.3 12.2 24.9 91.4 58.1 70.9 76.4 81.2 101.6
Investment of developed countries (billions of
U.S dollars) 160.8252.7 399.1 677.5 725.5 829.9 957.1 1,175.3 n.a.
Investment of LDCs as a proportion of total
investment 4.9 4.6 5.9 5.8 7.4 8.5 8.4 7.8 8.0
GNP of LDCs as a proportion of total GNP 5.6 5.0 5.6 5.9 6.9 7.1 7.4 7.2 7.1
Investment ofdevelopedcountries as a pro.
portionofthcirGNP 17.8 19.2 20.0 21.8 21.1 20.0 20.0 20.4 20.9
Investmentof LDCs as a proportion of their
GNP 15.7 17.7 20.9 21.4 22.8 24.2 23.1 22.4 23.6
Sources:LDC and developed countrics arc the same as those in tables 9 and 9. The inveatment and GNP data arc from International Monetary Fund. InsernasionalFi..
flo,wIa! S,ogis:irs,series93c and 99a. respecti..cl.
n.j. Not available.
FromSachs [1981, p.2391.—62—
The large debtor countries enjoy continued access to international loans
though many display high Debt/GNP or Debt/Exports ratios. Since they also have
high savings rates, the debt levels reflect high investment, and are therefore
not a prima facie matter of concern. More generally, a leading banker has
stated that developing countries "with good economic management are able to
borrows much in excess of any debt—service requirement," giving these countries
"strong incentives to pursue policies that maintain their creditworthiness with
private banks." Most rescheduiings can be traced to a combination of "bad luck"
(e.g. excessive government spending in light of the terms—of—trade shift), which
shows up as a fall in domestic savings.
Some examples of investment and savings develoçnents for countries that
rescheduled public debt between 1975 and 1980 are found in Table 12.In all cases,
there is some drop in savings rates after 1970—73, though it is apparently
slight for Turkey. In these cases, and in many other similar examples, the
extent of bank lending available to the debtor country fell sharply as the
savings rate deteriorated. A freeze on new lending, in line with the credit—
ceiling model described earlier, seems to take hold before the debt rescheduling
process begins. When new loans are unavailable to finance interest and amor-
tization payments, the country typically begins to accumulate arrearages, at
which point it signals its need for a debt rescheduling, and its willingness to
undertake a stabilization program.
An important question for us ii whether the stabilization programs in fact
stabilize, or merely protect the banks from the onus of an explicit default.-63—
Very broadly speaking, the record is one of mixed, though substantial success in
moderating current account deficits, but often at significant political and eco-
nomic costs to the debtor. Clear examples of success in recent years include
Chile and Peru, who have both restored high economic growth and declining exter-
nal indebtedness relative to GNP. Following its 1975 rescheduling, Chile's
Debt/GNP ratio fell from 59.6 percent (1975) to 37.2 percent (1979). Similarly,
Peru's fell from a high of 66.3percentin the year of its rescheduling (1978)
to 58.0 percent in the next. And in both cases, real economic activity and
savings picked up one year after the rescheduling.
More serious dilemmas exist for countries like Zaire and Sudan, for which
stabilization programs have imposed very significant costs on output and growth.
In Zaire, for example, real consumption levels and GNP have been declining
sharply and continuously since the first rescheduling in 1976. In 1979, the
Debt/GNP ratio was a whopping 51.8 percent, though the debt amounted toamere
$3.8 billion. Continued stringent policies will undoubtedly reduce this debt,
though at further extreme hardship to the very poor country. In the pre—1930
arrangements, Zaire would have long ago defaulted. And if economic prospects
subsequently improved, it would have redeemed a fraction of the value of the
debt. Unluckily, Zaire provided the first case of rescheduling of the private
banks in the 1970s, and the stand that they took was consequently stern. The
IMP should create mechanisms in the future to allow for greater debt relief of
suchcountries.
I close the analysis by returning to an indirect risk in international
lending,that an eventsuch as a default or bank failure might dramatically
shrinkthe market for international loans. While the system of creditor clubs—64—
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FromS3chs [1981, p.2461.—65—
and IMF oversight probably moderates this risk to some extent, there is no
guarantee that the FUnd could effectively keep private credit lines open in the
event of a major panic. Indeed, the ;market responses in 1974—75 to the
Herstatt and Franklin Iational Bank failures only reinforce the fears of a major
calamity emanating from the credit supply side. As a recent IMF report records,
the bank failures had major consquences or interbank rela-
tionships and international lending. Tiering of interbank
deposit rates become considerably more pronounced and many
small and medium—sized banks withdrew from the market,
leaving more of the recycling up to those big banks which
tended to receive deposits themselves. Japanese banks also
retreated from the market because of prudential concerns,
particularly on the funding side. Connected with these
events was an adrupt hardening of lending terms and a decline
in new credit commitments.
An important reason that this restraint did not have more serious consequences
is that the drop in real interest rates across the board in 1974—75 far exceeded
the rise in spreads on loans to the LDCs, so that overall credit terms improved
for those countries for which credit was available.
Some steps were taken in 1974—75 to protect the capital markets from a chain
of bank failures, including the "1975 Concordat of the Cooke Committee" of the
Group of Ten (and Swiss) central banks, which vested primary responsibility for
the solvency of foreign bank branches with the home-country central bank..?-W A
second step was a tightening of central—bank supervision over the off—shore
portfolios of domestic banks. These are useful measures to prevent a breakdown
in confidence over the solvency of commercial banks in the international
market3. The nahility of medium—size banks to compete on the interbank market
in late 1975 is probably vitiated by the clarification and tightening of central
bank responsibility. But it seems much less likely that the steps taken in-66-
recent years would guarantee continued lending to LDCs in the event of an ini-
tial "shock" that starts with an LDC default or debt repudiation. To use the
old cliche regarding monetary policy, infusions of central bank reserves in such
a case might be like "pushing on a string," without guaranteeing continued loans
to the LDC.—67—
V. In Lieu of a Conclusion
This essay merely raises some of the issues involved in a complicated and
controversial topic. I have even ignored one major aspect of the risks of
international lending: the vulnerability of the international banking system to
a large default or debt moratorium. I have had to handle in a very cursory way
the strategic aspects of LDC negotiations with official and private creditors in
recent years. This is especially troubling since gaming behavior is at the core
of many of the risks to international debt today.
The theoretical analysis stresses that the riskineses of debt (or the cre-
ditworthiness of a sovereign borrower) depends on (1) the overall savings and
investment behavior in the borrowing country; and (2) the institutional set—up
within which loans are extended. On the first point, a sharp rise in indebted-
ness that reflects high investment rates is far less risky than a comparable
increase in debt that is financing a drop in savings rates. For this reason,
country—risk indicators such as debt—GNP ratios or debt—service ratios can only
tell a partial story; the important criteria for creditworthiness must focus on
the reasons for rising indebtedness. On the second point, the IMF has a key
role in arranging package deals that commit sovereign borrowers to stabilization
programs in return for continued credit flows. When such arrangements cannot be
negotiated (as in Poland), the risks of default rise substantially.
With regard to the recent borrowing experience, I have tried to suggest a
reason for optimism. Onemustfocus on theunderlyingeconomic factors leading
to the high levels of borrowing in order to get a clear view of the dangers
therein. Both the ability to repay debt and the disincentives to default rise
to the extent that indebtedness reflects high levels of domestic investment
rather than low levels of savings. Andatleast for the major borrowing—68-
countries, such a pattern is evident in the 1970s (unfortunately the data for
savings behavior after the second oil shock, in 1979—80, are not yet in).
According to the theoretical discussion, this co—occurance of high investment
rates and large lending to the LDCs is not merely fortuitous; rational creditors
will raise their exposure on sovereign debt in line with high savings and
investment rates of the borrower. In any event, there is no facile relationship
between oil—import dependence and deficits in recent years, which is a good
thing for the borrowers, creditors, and the international community as a whole.-69—
Footnotes
1. For good recent summaries, see IMF [1980a,i989b], Aronson [1977], World Bank
[i 981].
2. See Sachs [1981, pp.264—268] for a discussion.
3. It is easy to see that uNDUC for all values of D1. Both UND and Uc are
the maximum values of U(C1)+U(C2)/(i+ subject to various constraints. The
solution for UC is subject to the same constraints as for UND, plus the
added constraint D1 =h(I1).Since UC is subject to an added constraint,
UC must beUND.
4.Mintz [1951], p. .TheMintz study offers a brilliant analysis of the
international loan market in the 1920s.
5. This paragraph relies on Borchard [1951].-70-
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